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Standard quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols typically assume that the distant parties share a com-
mon reference frame. In practice, however, establishing and maintaining a good alignment between distant
observers is rarely a trivial issue, which may significantly restrain the implementation of long-distance quantum
communication protocols. Here we propose simple QKD protocols that do not require the parties to share any
reference frame, and study their security and feasibility in both the usual device-dependent case—in which the
two parties use well characterized measurement devices—as well as in the device-independent case—in which
the measurement devices can be untrusted, and the security relies on the violation of a Bell inequality. To illus-
trate the practical relevance of these ideas, we present a proof-of-principle demonstration of our protocols using
polarization entangled photons distributed over a coiled 10-km-long optical fiber. We consider two situations,
in which either the fiber spool freely drifts, or randomly chosen polarization transformations are applied. The
correlations obtained from measurements allow, with high probability, to generate positive asymptotic secret
key rates in both the device-dependent and device-independent scenarios (under the fair-sampling assumption
for the latter case).
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution [1] is arguably the most developed area in quantum information processing, and has recently
reached the commercial level. Currently the main limitation of QKD is the distance between the parties. State of the art ex-
periments have reported key exchanges up to distances of ∼ 250 km [2]. It is a great challenge in this area to reach much
longer distances, such as intercontinental distances, and tremendous effort is made in this direction. Significant progress has
been recently reported, with promising developments in quantum repeaters [3], as well as in satellite-based quantum communi-
cations [4, 5].
The main reason for this challenge to practical implementations of QKD protocols, and more generally all long-distance
quantum communication tasks, is the effect of noise and loss. Many studies have been devoted to these problems. There is
however another key issue, often overseen, which is the alignment of a common reference frame between the parties. While
usually being assumed a priori (hence not discussed) in theoretical works, the alignment of a common reference frame is rarely
a trivial task in practice. Furthermore, when performing experiments outside of the laboratory, this issue can become highly
cumbersome, and may significantly restrain—and even hinder—the implementation of certain quantum protocols. For instance,
in fiber-based quantum communications, polarization rotations are induced by unavoidable temperature changes, which makes
it challenging to maintain a good alignment. Also, in satellite-based quantum communications, establishing and maintaining a
good alignment between the satellite and the ground station is a challenge [5], given the fast movement of the satellite and the
limited amount of time for completing the protocol.
It is therefore relevant to consider quantum communication protocols in which the requirement of a common reference frame
can be dispensed with. An elegant solution to this problem is to use decoherence-free subspaces [6, 7]. However, this generally
amounts to using high-dimensional quantum systems, the practical implementation of which is challenging—although progress
has been achieved recently [8]. It turns out however that one can in fact relax the shared reference frame assumption in certain
simple quantum communication protocols that only involve qubits. This approach has received some attention in the context
of tests of quantum nonlocality [9]: in particular it was recently shown [10, 11], and experimentally illustrated [10, 12], that
Bell inequality violations can be guaranteed even if the parties share no common measurement basis. In the context of QDK,
Laing and colleagues [13] presented a protocol—dubbed “Reference Frame Independent”, and recently implemented in Ref.
[14]—which requires the parties to only have one common measurement basis. While the latter approach is well suited and
proposes an interesting solution for certain QKD implementations, it is however not adapted to all systems.
Here we propose QKD protocols that do not assume the existence of any shared reference frame. We analyse their security
and feasibility in two scenarios. In the first, “device-independent” (DI) case [15, 16], the two communicating parties Alice and
Bob use untrusted measurement devices and do not make any assumption on their functioning; the security of the protocol is
ensured by the violation of a Bell inequality (for a recent review, see [17]). In the second, standard “device-dependent” (DD)
case, Alice and Bob trust that their devices faithfully implement the prescribed measurements—which further constrains the
possible attacks by an eavesdropper, Eve, detectable by Alice and Bob. We show in both cases that if Alice and Bob do not
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2share a common reference frame but measure entangled pairs of quantum systems along randomly orientated measurement
bases, they can still expect to generate, with reasonably large probability (which depends on the assumptions for the security
analysis), secret keys with positive key rates. We then demonstrate the experimental relevance of these ideas by presenting
a proof-of-principle implementation of our protocols using a photonic QKD setup with polarization entangled photons. For
all cases under consideration, we could calculate, with non-zero probability, positive (asymptotic) secret key rates as obtained
from the preceding security analysis (assuming the fair sampling assumption in the DI case to calculate the violation of a Bell
inequality). This suggests that the requirement of a common reference frame can indeed—if need be—be completely dispensed
with in experimental QKD, thus opening promising perspectives for long-distance and satellite-based QKD.
II. DEVICE-INDEPENDENT PROTOCOL
In our first protocol, Alice and Bob can each perform one out of 3 possible local measurements, labeled by x = 1, 2, 3 for
Alice and y = 1, 2, 3 for Bob, on a shared entangled quantum state ρAB . All measurements are dichotomic, giving a binary
outcome a for Alice and b for Bob. The protocol is device-independent in the sense that we shall not make any assumption on
which measurements are physically implemented by Alice and Bob’s measuring apparatuses, nor of the dimension of the state
ρAB .
After repeating the above operations sufficiently many times, Alice and Bob can, by communicating a random subset of their
measurement choices and results, estimate the correlations they share, i.e. the probability distribution P (a, b|x, y). For now we
will focus on the correlators Exy = P (a=b|x, y)− P (a 6=b|x, y). From these, Alice and Bob can in particular calculate the 36
values (for all x, x′, y and y′) of the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) [18] parameters
Sxx′yy′ = |Exy + Exy′ + Ex′y − Ex′y′ |. (1)
If any of these CHSH values is greater than 2, Alice and Bob can certify that the observed correlations are “nonlocal”, in the
sense that they violate Bell’s local causality assumption [19]. Observing quantum nonlocality is not only interesting for testing
the foundations of quantum theory, it can also have practical applications—in our case of interest it can indeed allow one, for a
large enough value of a CHSH parameter together with a large enough value for at least one correlator, to prove the security of
QKD protocols in a device-independent way [15, 16, 20, 21, 24].
Interestingly, it was shown in Refs. [10, 11] that if Alice and Bob share a maximally entangled 2-qubit state, say the singlet
state |Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉), and can each choose among 3 orthogonal measurements, represented for Alice (Bob) by 3
orthogonal vectors ~ax (~by) on the Bloch sphere, there is always at least one of the 36 CHSH values Sxx′yy′ that is above the local
bound of 2—unless Alice and Bob’s orthogonal measurement triads are perfectly aligned. Moreover, if Alice and Bob do not
share any common reference frame and the relative orientation of their measurement triads is random, the largest CHSH value
they observe is typically quite large: its average value was empirically found to be ∼ 2.6 for random relative orientations drawn
from a uniform distribution on the Bloch sphere [10].
This suggests that it should be possible to extract reasonably large secret key rates from the correlations obtained by Alice
and Bob, without the requirement that they share a common reference frame (i.e. their orthogonal measurement triads are not
pre-aligned). We study this idea below, following the security analyses of both Pironio et al. [20]—which proves the security
against collective attacks—and of Masanes et al. [21]—which considers the security against general (coherent) attacks, only
assuming memoryless devices. Note that full security proofs of DI QKD, considering the most general attacks, were recently
reported [22, 23]. However, these proofs are not robust to noise, hence of limited practical interest, and we do not consider these
in this work.
A. Device-independent security analysis along the lines of Pironio et al. [20]
Ref. [20] considered a DI-QKD protocol with 3 inputs for Alice (in our notations, x = 1, 2, 3) and 2 inputs for Bob (y = 1, 2).
Considering the CHSH parameter S1212 and the correlator E31 (see Eq. 1 above), it was shown that (if S1212 > 2) a secret key
can be extracted through 1-way classical post-processing (from Bob to Alice) from the data obtained when using the settings
x = 3 and y = 1—the “raw key”—at an asymptotic rate (see details in [20])
R ≥ 1− h
[1− E31
2
]
− h
[1 +√(S1212/2)2 − 1
2
]
, (2)
where h(p) = −p log2 p − (1−p) log2(1−p) is the binary entropy function. This bound on the secret key-rate ensures the
security of the QKD protocol in the DI scenario against collective attacks [1], in the limit of infinite key lengths. The term
h
[
1−E31
2
]
represents the (minimum) amount of information that Alice and Bob need to classically exchange in order to correct
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FIG. 1: Estimated distribution of the bound rDI1 (3) on the secret key rate (in the DI scenario, following the analysis of [20]—i.e. ensuring
security against collective attacks), obtained by generating 107 random pairs of orthogonal measurement triads uniformly distributed on the
Bloch sphere, to be measured on Werner states of visibilities V = 1, 0.98 and 0.95. For each value of V , each data point corresponds to the
number of samples (out of 107) giving a value rDI1 within an interval of sive δr = 0.01.
the errors in their raw keys, while the term h
[ 1+√(S1212/2)2−1
2
]
is a bound on Eve’s Holevo information conditioned on Bob’s
measurement result. Both need to be reduced through privacy amplification.
The same protocol as in [20] can be run by following the protocol detailed above, in which Alice and Bob do not share a
common reference frame (see start of Sec. II), with 3 settings for both Alice and Bob, by using any four correlators Ex(′)y(′) to
estimate a CHSH parameter Sxx′yy′ , and any pair of settings (xraw, yraw) to define the raw key—with the important condition
that either xraw ∈ {x, x′} or yraw ∈ {y, y′}. Let us then define
rDI1 = max
x,x′,y,y′,xraw,yraw,
s.t. S
xx′yy′>2,
xraw∈{x,x′} or yraw∈{y,y′}
[
1− h
[1−Exrawyraw
2
]
− h
[1+√(Sxx′yy′/2)2−1
2
]]
, (3)
corresponding to the rate (2) for the optimal choice of settings used to define the CHSH parameter and the raw key (by convention,
if no violation Sxx′yy′ > 2 is found we define rDI1 = −1. From the analysis of [20], if rDI1 is found to be non-negative, then
Alice and Bob will indeed be able to extract a secret key with an asymptotic rate of (at least) rDI1 , in the DI scenario, secure
against collective attacks1.
In order to study the experimental feasibility of such a protocol the questions we need to address are the following: How likely
is rDI1 to be positive? What are its typical values, and how are they distributed if Alice and Bob’s orthogonal measurement triads
are randomly chosen?
To answer these questions, we estimated the distribution of rDI1 by generating 10
7 pairs of random orthogonal measurement
triads {~ax} and {~by}, independently drawn from a uniform distribution on the Bloch sphere. For each pair of triads, we computed
the 9 correlators Exy assuming that Alice and Bob receives pure (noise-free) maximally entangled states ρAB = |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|
(hence, Exy = −~ax ·~by), and calculated the bound rDI1 (3) on the secret key rate that Alice and Bob can extract. The results
of our simulation are plotted on Figure 1. We found that ∼ 83.9% of our samples of rDI1 were positive (i.e., we estimate the
probability for Alice and Bob to obtain rDI1 > 0 to be ∼ 83.9%), with a maximum value for the distribution of rDI1 observed
around rDI1 ∼ 0.25. The average value of rDI1 was found to be ∼ 0.173; if we post-select only the cases in which rDI1 > 0,
the average value becomes ∼ 0.226. The maximum value for rDI1 is found to be ∼ 0.450, obtained if two of Alice and Bob’s
measurement settings coincide (say, ~ax′′ = ~by′′ ), while the other two pairs of settings, used to define Sxx′yy′ , are coplanar (with
an angle ∼ 0.642 rad from one pair to the other).
It is also important to study the effect of noise on the secret key rates rDI1 . For that, we similarly estimated the distribution
of rDI1 if the measurements are now performed on noisy singlet states (Werner states [25]) ρ
V
AB = V |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−| + (1−V )1 /4
1Note that instead of throwing some raw data away, Alice and Bob could additionally try to extract some secret key from their measurement results obtained by
using other settings than the optimal (xraw, yraw), if any other choice also leads to a positive bound on the key rate through (2). For simplicity we do not consider
this possibility in this paper, and only focus on rDI1 as defined in (3).
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FIG. 2: Estimated distribution of the bound rDI2 (5) on the secret key rate for Werner states of visibilities V = 1, 0.98 and 0.95 (in the DI
scenario, following the analysis of [21]—i.e. showing security against coherent attacks, for memoryless devices), obtained as in Figure 1.
(which gives Exy = −V~ax · ~by), for V = 0.98 and 0.95; see Figure 1. As expected, the secret key rates are reduced as V
decreases. For V = 0.98 and V = 0.95, the probabilities that rDI1 > 0 are, however, still ∼ 72.1% and ∼ 38.0%, respectively.
Note in this respect that the violations of a CHSH inequality were found in Ref. [10] to be quite robust to noise; for instance, the
probability that at least one value of Sxx′yy′ is greater than 2 is still above 99.9% for V = 0.95.
B. Device-independent security analysis along the lines of Masanes et al. [21]
Ref. [21] provides a different approach to prove the security of a DI-QKD scheme. For the same protocol as in Ref. [20],
Masanes et al. proved that (for S1212 > 0) a secret key—now secure against coherent attacks, but under the assumption that
their measurement devices are causally independent (or memoryless)—can be extracted at an asymptotic rate [21]
R ≥ − h
[1− E31
2
]
− log2
[1 +√2− (S1212/2)2
2
]
. (4)
Again, the term h
[
1−E31
2
]
is due to the necessary error correction, while the term log2
[ 1+√2−(S1212/2)2
2
]
is now a bound on the
min-entropy of Alice’s raw key conditioned on Eve’s information. The information of both must be removed through privacy
amplification to extract a secret key.
Let us then now define, for our experimental procedure with 3 settings for Alice and Bob,
rDI2 = max
x,x′,y,y′,xraw,yraw,
s.t. S
xx′yy′>2,
xraw∈{x,x′} or yraw∈{y,y′}
[
− h
[1−Exrawyraw
2
]
− log2
[1 +√2−(Sxx′yy′/2)2
2
]]
. (5)
As before, if rDI2 is found to be non-negative, then Alice and Bob will indeed be able to extract a secret key with a rate (at least)
rDI2 .
Again, we wish to determine how likely it is that rDI2 is positive, and how its typical values and distribution look like when
Alice and Bob’s orthogonal measurement triads are randomly chosen from a uniform distribution on the Bloch sphere. For that,
we estimated the distribution of rDI2 in a similar way as for rDI1 . The results of our simulation are plotted in Figure 2. We
found that ∼ 49.0% of our samples of rDI2 were positive, and observed a peak in the distribution of rDI2 for values around
∼ 0.08. The average value of rDI2 was found to be ∼ −0.034; if we post-select only the cases in which rDI2 > 0, the average
value becomes ∼ 0.093. The maximum value for rDI2 is obtained if two of Alice and Bob’s measurement settings coincide,
while the other two pairs of settings, used to define Sxx′yy′ , are coplanar, at 45◦ from one another—i.e. they correspond to the
optimal choice of settings for testing the CHSH inequality (which was not the case for the optimal settings for rDI1 ). In that
case, one gets rDI2 = 1− h( 1−1/
√
2
2 ) ' 0.399.
We also, as before, considered the effect of depolarizing noise on the secret key rates rDI2 (see Figure 2). For V = 0.98, we
found the probability that rDI2 > 0 to be ∼ 18.0%; for V = 0.95, however, no positive secret key rate rDI2 is obtained any
more.
5Note that rDI2 is always smaller than rDI1 . This comes from the different techniques used in the proofs: Ref. [21] is based
on the calculation of min-entropies to estimate Eve’s information, while Ref. [20] is based on the calculation of Eve’s Holevo
information (which involves von Neumann entropies). The security analysis of Ref. [21] is more stringent in that it considers
more general attacks. It is an open question whether any of the two analyses can be improved to account for more general attacks
or to lead to higher bounds on the secret key rates (e.g. whether the higher bound of Ref. [20] also holds for the same class of
attacks as considered in Ref. [21]).
III. DEVICE-DEPENDENT PROTOCOL
We now turn to the more standard device-dependent (DD) scenario, in which Alice and Bob trust their measurement appa-
ratuses. We assume that the apparatuses implement dichotomic qubit measurements, that ρAB is a 2-qubit state, and that the
3 measurement settings they can each choose from, as before, trustfully correspond to orthogonal projective measurements,
represented by 3 orthogonal Bloch vectors ~ax for Alice, and by 3 orthogonal Bloch vectors~by for Bob.
It is convenient here to think of Alice’s and Bob’s measurements along the orthogonal directions ~ax and~by as the application
of an adequate local unitary operation on their respective qubit, followed by a measurement along the axes X, Y, Z of their Bloch
spheres2. Choosing random orientations for the orthogonal measurement triads ~ax and~by is equivalent to choosing random local
unitary transformations to apply to the 2-qubit state ρAB .
In this view, the QKD protocol we are considering, with a choice of measurement among three orthogonal directions, is
nothing but the entanglement-based version of the well-known 6-state protocol [26, 27]. Its standard security analysis can thus
directly be applied. The only difference in our case here will concern its typical implementation: we shall not assume that Alice
and Bob can (in the ideal case) share an entangled state with any particular symmetries adapted to their measurement bases, but
instead, that their qubits undergo some uncontrolled rotations before being measured.
Note already that in the device-dependent scenario, entanglement-based protocols can readily be translated into prepare-and-
measure ones [1] (whose practical implementations are typically simpler), and the following analysis would still apply.
A. Device-dependent security analysis a` la 6-state protocol
Following the analysis presented in Appendix A of Ref. [1], one can show that the asymptotic secret key rate one can extract
in the 6-state protocol from the data measured (say) with the settings x = y = 3 (corresponding to a σZ measurement, with the
convention that x, y = 1 and x, y = 2 correspond to σX and σY measurements, resp.), under 1-way classical post-processing,
and secure against the most general coherent attacks (in the device-dependent scenario) is bounded by
R ≥ 1 − H
[{1+E11+E22−E33
4
,
1+E11−E22+E33
4
,
1−E11+E22+E33
4
,
1−E11−E22−E33
4
}]
, (6)
where H[{pi}] = −
∑
i pi log2 pi is the Shannon entropy (and {pi} is a length 4 vector of probabilities).
In our case, the association between each of Alice’s 3 measurement settings and one of Bob’s settings is not defined a priori,
but can be optimized so as to end up with the largest possible secret key rate—that is, we can choose the optimal permutation
pi({1, 2, 3}) = {y1, y2, y3} of Bob’s settings to be associated to Alice’s settings {1, 2, 3}. Taking into account the fact that
Eq. (6) assumes a given handedness for the orientation of Alice and Bob’s settings (that of {~X, ~Y,~Z}), we define
rDD(6−state)
= max
{y1,y2,y3}
=pi({1,2,3})
[
1 − H
[{1+σpi(E1y1+E2y2−E3y3)
4
,
1+σpi(E1y1−E2y2+E3y3)
4
,
1+σpi(−E1y1+E2y2+E3y3)
4
,
1−σpi(E1y1+E2y2+E3y3)
4
}]]
, (7)
2Alternatively, one can use the orthogonal directions ~ax and ~by to redefine the X, Y, Z axes of Alice and Bob’s Bloch spheres, and hence their computational
bases, and rewrite ρAB in these new bases (which indeed amounts to applying local unitaries to ρAB).
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FIG. 3: Estimated distribution of the bound rDD(6−state) (7) on the secret key rate for Werner states of visibilities V = 1, 0.98 and 0.95 (in
the DD scenario, following the analysis “a` la 6-state protocol”), obtained as in Figures 1 and 2.
where σpi = ±1 is the signature of the permutation pi. rDD(6−state) is thus a lower bound on the asymptotic extractable secret
key rate of our device-dependent protocol, secure against coherent attacks in the limit of infinitely long keys, obtained from the
standard analysis of the 6-state protocol3.
We again estimated the distribution of the bound rDD(6−state) in a similar manner as before, i.e. if Alice and Bob share
(noisy) singlet states and their measurement orientations (or their local unitaries, equivalently—cf above) are chosen at random,
uniformly on the Bloch sphere. The results are shown in Figure 3. In the noiseless case (V = 1) we found that ∼ 89.2% of
our samples led to positive secret key rates rDD(6−state) > 0. The average value of rDD(6−state) was found to be ∼ 0.330; if
post-selected to the cases in which rDD(6−state) > 0, it becomes ∼ 0.379. The maximum value of rDD(6−state) is 1, obtained
e.g. when ρAB is a pure singlet state and Alice and Bob’s measurement axes are perfectly aligned (as in the standard case of the
6-state protocol). For V = 0.98 and 0.95, as the key rates decrease, we still found that ∼ 84.4% and ∼ 75.6% of our samples,
respectively, led to positive secret key rates rDD(6−state) > 0.
We note that the key rates obtained from (7), in the DD scenario, are typically larger than those found in the DI scenario
considered in the previous section. This was expected, as the assumptions on Eve’s possible attacks are more restrictive in the
DD scenario. For instance, Eve cannot act on Alice and Bob’s measurement apparatuses—which, in the DI scenario, indeed
allows her to perform more powerful attacks [20]. An interesting difference between the DD and DI scenarios is the optimal
orientations of settings. In the DD scenario, one only aims at maximizing three of the correlators |Exy|, and the optimal
arrangement does not allow the violation of any Bell inequality; on the other hand, in the DI scenario a trade-off must be found
between a large enough violation of a Bell inequality and a large enough correlator |Exrawyraw | (cf above).
B. Improved device-dependent security analysis
In the security analysis of the 6-state protocol that leads to the closed form (6), one uses the fact that an upper bound on
Eve’s information can be obtained, through a “depolarization process”, by restricting oneself to Bell-diagonal states ρAB (cf
Appendix A of [1]). While this use of the symmetries of the protocol may be well adapted for standard implementations in
which Alice and Bob share a common reference frame and indeed expect their state ρAB to be (close to) a Bell-diagonal state,
the upper bound thus obtained may in general be over-pessimistic, and it may be possible to actually derive larger bounds on the
secret key rates—as we now show.
In the experimental situation we consider, Alice and Bob each repeatedly perform one out of three orthogonal qubit measure-
ments. Their full statistics—i.e. their correlators Exy , together with the marginal probabilities P (a|x) and P (b|y) (which are
expected to be uniformly 1/2 for maximally entangled 2-qubit states, possibly including white noise)—then actually allow them
to fully reconstruct the state ρAB , up to local unitary rotations, through quantum state tomography [31]. This can be used to
3Note that by considering only 2 of the 3 settings of both Alice and Bob, one can follow the security analysis for the BB84 protocol [28] (cf e.g. the Appendix A
of [1]), and derive a simpler bound on the asymptotic secret key rate, secure against coherent attacks (and actually proven to give one-sided device independent
security [29, 30], under the memoryless assumption), given by rDD(BB84) = maxx 6=x′,y 6=y′
[
1 − h( 1−Exy
2
) − h( 1−Ex′y′
2
)]
. Numerical simulations
suggest that this bound is in general only slightly lower than rDD(6−state) (7), and gives comparable distributions to those of Figure 3.
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FIG. 4: Estimated distribution of the bound rDD (10) on the secret key rate for Werner states of visibilities V = 1, 0.98 and 0.95 (in the DD
scenario, improving on the standard analysis for the 6-state protocol), obtained as in Figures 1–3.
estimate Eve’s information more tightly—e.g., in the ideal case in which the state ρAB would be found to be a pure state (such
as a maximally entangled state), then one can be assured that Eve is not correlated to it.
More precisely, to study the security against collective attacks, the information potentially available to an eavesdropper can be
represented by a quantum system E that is correlated to Alice and Bob’s system in such a way that it “purifies” the reconstructed
state ρAB—i.e., one can define a purification |ψABE〉 of ρAB (a pure 3-partite state such that TrE |ψABE〉〈ψABE | = ρAB), and
give the quantum system E to Eve.
Let us denote by ρE = TrAB |ψABE〉〈ψABE | Eve’s partial state and by ρE|Ax=a her conditional state corresponding to Alice’s
measurement resultAx=a for the choice of setting x, and let us define Eve’s Holevo information conditioned on Alice’s outcome
as
χ(Ax : E) = S(ρE)−
∑
a
p(Ax=a)S(ρE|Ax=a), (8)
where S denotes the von Neumann entropy [S(ρ) = −Tr(ρlog2ρ)]. We similarly define χ(By : E) to be Eve’s Holevo
information conditioned on Bob’s measurement result for the choice of setting y. A lower bound on the asymptotic secret key
rate one can extract through 1-way post-processing from the dataAxraw , Byraw obtained from the measurement of the settings xraw
and yraw is then given by the Devetak-Winter bound [32]
R ≥ I(Axraw : Byraw)−min[χ(Axraw : E), χ(Byraw : E)], (9)
where I(Axraw : Byraw) is the mutual information between Alice’s and Bob’s measurement results Axraw and Byraw which, after
randomization of Alice and Bob’s marginals (through a simultaneous random flipping of their results), is equal to I(Axraw :
Byraw) = 1 − h
[ 1−Exrawyraw
2
]
. The bound (9) ensures the security of the secret key against collective attacks (in the limit of
infinitely long keys); using a de Finetti type of argument, one can show that the same secret key rate is also secure against
coherent attacks [33].
In our case, Alice and Bob still have the possibility to choose the settings from which they will attempt to extract a secret key.
Let us accordingly define
rDD = max
xraw,yraw
[
1 − H
[1−Exrawyraw
2
]
−min [χ(Axraw : E), χ(Byraw : E)]
]
, (10)
If rDD is found to be non-negative, then Alice and Bob will actually be able to extract a secret key with a rate (at least) rDD—
which is larger than the previous bound rDD(6−state) (7).
In the ideal case in which Alice and Bob find that they share noiseless singlet states, the state ρAB is pure. This implies in
particular that Eve’s Holevo information is null: χ(Axraw : E) = χ(Byraw : E) = 0. The bound rDD (10) on the secret key rate
then just depends on the largest correlator (in absolute value) Exy = −~ax · ~by observed by Alice and Bob. One can show in
that case that if Alice’s and Bob’s 3 measurements settings are orthogonal, this largest correlator is necessarily greater than 23
(obtained if all scalar products ~ax ·~by are either ± 23 or ± 13 ), and hence rDD ≥ 1 − h
(
1
6
) ' 0.350 > 0; on the other hand, the
maximum value 1 of rDD is attained if any two of Alice and Bob’s settings are aligned. As in the previous cases, we estimated
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FIG. 5: Experimental setup. A horizontally polarized, pulsed (50 ps), 532 nm wavelength laser beam is rotated to diagonal polarization via
a half wave-plate (HWP), is then split by a polarizing beam splitter (PBS) and travels both clockwise and counter-clockwise through a polar-
ization Sagnac interferometer. The interferometer contains two type-I, spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC), periodically-poled
lithium niobate (PPLN) crystals configured to produce collinear, non-degenerate, 810/1550 nm wavelength photon pairs. The clockwise-
travelling, vertically polarized (counter-clockwise travelling, horizontally polarized) pump light passes through the first crystal without inter-
action (as SPDC is polarization dependent) and may down-convert in the V-PPLN crystal (H-PPLN) to produce two horizontally (vertically)
polarized photons. After exiting the interferometer, the remaining pump light is filtered out using a high-pass filter and the entangled photons
are separated on a dichroic mirror (DM) and sent to qubit analyzers consisting of waveplates, a PBS and single-photon detectors.
the distribution of rDD for randomly chosen orientations for Alice and Bob’s measurement triads; see Figure 4. Its average value
was found to be ∼ 0.745.
If Alice and Bob determine that they find a noisy Werner state with V < 1, they calculate Eve’s Holevo information to be (for
all x, y) χ(Ax : E) = χ(By : E) = H
[{ 1+3V4 , 1−V4 , 1−V4 , 1−V4 }]− h[ 1−V2 ]. The distribution of rDD, estimated as before, is
also shown on Figure 4 for V = 0.98 and V = 0.95. In both cases we always find positive bounds rDD on the secret key rates
(in fact, rDD is always positive for V & 0.875).
IV. PROOF-OF-PRINCIPLE EXPERIMENTS
To demonstrate the practical relevance of our theoretical discussions, we performed a proof-of-principle demonstration of
QKD using the four security analyses discussed above. In our experiment Alice generated a sequence of pairs of polarization
entangled photons and sent one photon of each pair to Bob via a channel with an unknown polarization transformation. Both
parties projectively measured the polarization state of their photon in one of three mutually unbiased bases. Neither Alice nor
Bob attempted to align their measurement devices, as we do not want to assume that they share a common reference frame.
After collecting sufficient data on each pair of projectors—giving the 9 correlators Eij as described above and allowing for the
tomography of the quantum state shared by Alice and Bob (for the calculation of rDD)—asymptotic secret key rates from each
of the above analyses were calculated. Note that our demonstration is proof-of-principle only as we do not randomly select bases
nor perform the required error correction or privacy amplification, which is required to generate actual secret keys (and which
would require a rigorous finite-key analysis, which would go beyond the scope of this paper). Nor do we close the detection
loophole as necessary to generate key for device-independent QKD.
A. Experimental setup
Fig. 5 shows a schematic of our experiments. Alice holds a source of polarization-entangled qubits and a qubit analyzer (details
below). Her entanglement source is based on two spontaneous parametric downconversion (SPDC) crystals in a polarizing
Sagnac interferometer, described and characterized previously in [34, 35]. Diagonally polarized pump light from a pulsed
532 nm wavelength laser is placed in a superposition of traveling clockwise (CW) and counter-clockwise (CCW) around the
Sagnac interferometer. In the CCW path, vertically polarized pump light passes unaffected through the first SPDC crystal,
which is oriented to down-convert horizontally polarized pump light, and then produces pairs of vertically polarized photons
in the second SPDC crystal. Similarly, the CW path produces pairs of horizontally polarized photons. Each pair consists of
one photon at around 810 nm wavelength and one photon at around 1550 nm. By recombining the two paths at the output of
9the interferometer, and keeping pump powers sufficiently low, Alice generates a two-qubit state close to the |Φ+〉 Bell state4.
Performing quantum state tomography based on a maximum likelihood optimization [31] with the source revealed an average
tangle of T = 0.85 ± 0.02 (note that T = 1 implies a maximally entangled state and that we observed the tangle to oscillate
between 0.82 and 0.88 over the course of the experiment); this value of the tangle corresponds, for an ideal Werner state, to an
average visibility of about V = 0.95± 0.01.
During experiments, Alice separates the two entangled photons with a dichroic mirror and measures the 810 nm photon
directly with her qubit analyzer, which consists of waveplates, a polarizing beam splitter (PBS) and a free-running silicon
avalanche photo-diode (APD). Alice also sends the 1550 nm photon to Bob via a 10 km fiber spool with approx. 6 dB loss,
which serves as the quantum channel with unknown and varying polarization transformation, and, in parallel, generates an
electronic signal to inform Bob of the incoming photon. Bob then projectively measures the photon with his own qubit analyzer,
also consisting of waveplates, a PBS and a gated InGaAs APD. Measurement results from both Alice and Bob are recorded on
the same PC for analysis.
B. Experimental results
To demonstrate the feasibility of QKD without a shared reference frame with our setup, we performed two experiments.
In both experiments Alice and Bob collected statistics on one of the nine correlators for two minutes and then either Alice
or Bob would change measurement settings. Hence, 18 minutes were required to collect statistics on all nine correlators. In
the first experiment, Alice and Bob cycled through the measurement settings for nearly three hours while the polarization
transformation of the fiber spool was allowed to freely drift, which generated nine complete iterations through the measurements
of the correlators. For our second experiment, we inserted three waveplates into the channel connecting Alice and Bob to
randomly vary the polarization transformation and measured the nine correlators for each transformation.
In the first (free-drifting) experiment we analyzed the nearly three hours of data with a sliding 18 minute window: We first
analyzed the nine correlators and performed state tomography with the data within a window beginning at time t = 0 and going
to t = 18 min. We then repeatedly stepped the window forward by 2 minutes, yielding a total of 73 sets of data (e.g. the second
data set is between t = 2 min and t = 20 min, etc.), and analyzed each set independently. For each data set we calculated the
asymptotic secret key rates rDI1 , rDI2 , rDD(6−state) and rDD one could extract in each of the 4 scenarios, according to Eqs. (3),
(5), (7) and (10), respectively. In order to illustrate the role of the CHSH violation in the DI scenario and the importance of
having large correlators, we also calculated the maximal CHSH value5 Smax = maxx,x′,y,y′ Sxx′yy′ , and the largest sum of 3
correlators defined as Cmax = maxx6=x′ 6=x′′,y 6=y′ 6=y′′ |Exy|+ |Ex′y′ |+ |Ex′′y′′ |.
These results are presented in Fig. 6. Initially, and by chance, the channel transformation turned out to be such that a rea-
sonably high parameter Smax was found, favoring device-independent QKD, but over the course of the experiment, the channel
transformation slowly drifted close to a point where Alice’s and Bob’s measurement bases were aligned. At this point we
observed 3 high correlators (i.e. a large value for Cmax) and a low parameter Smax, which favours device-dependent QKD.
Indeed, when one examines the key rates as a function of time (i.e. window position) one observes steadily decreasing device-
independent key rates (in fact, rDI2 quickly falls to zero, whereas rDI1 remains positive for longer) and steadily increasing
device-dependent key rates.
These observations align with our discussion at the end of Sec. III A in that the alignment of bases optimal for device-
dependent and device-independent QKD are different. All our protocols require a source with a high degree of entanglement
(characterized, for instance, by a high visibility or high tangle). However, device-dependent QKD is optimal when Alice’s and
Bob’s measurement bases are well aligned such that one finds three large-valued correlators with which to generate key, which
minimizes key reduction due to error correction. On the other hand, in device-independent QKD one requires a set of four
correlators that generate a high S-parameter (to minimize the bound on Eve’s information and thus key reduction during privacy
amplification) with one correlator Exrawyraw being large so that error correction is minimal, which are conflicting requirements.
This conflicting nature is indeed illustrated in Fig. 6, where one observes that Smax decreases in time while C increases—just
as rDI1 and rDI2 decrease as rDD(6−state) and rDD increase.
Furthermore, the difference between secret key rates granted by the two device-dependent analyses, rDD(6−state) and rDD, are
apparent in Fig. 6(c). The difference between these techniques, as discussed in Sec. III B, is how one bounds an eavesdropper’s
information: rDD uses the Holevo information based on a reconstruction of the density matrix ρAB while rDD(6−state) uses
three correlators. If the quantum state that Alice and Bob share contains a high tangle, then Eve’s Holevo information will be
4Note that all maximally entangled 2-qubit states (such as |Φ+〉) are equivalent, up to a local unitary transformation, to the singlet state |Ψ−〉 considered in the
previous sections.
5Note that we do not claim that this maximal Smax value is necessarily the one that grants the maximum secret key rate (as the latter also depends on the
correlator Exrawyraw ; cf Eqs (3) and (5)). However, as having a large value of Smax(> 2) is a necessary condition for positive DI secret key rates, we will use
the Smax value as an indicator of the ability to generate key in the DI scenario.
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FIG. 6: Results from our free-drifting experiment, as a function of time (for each of our 72 data sets; see main text). (a–b) Our figures of merit:
the maximal CHSH value Smax and the maximal sum of correlators Cmax, as defined in the main text. (c) Asymptotic secret key rates rDI1 ,
rDI2 , rDD(6−state) and rDD corresponding to each of the 4 scenarios studied in Sections II and III.
low and thus rDD mainly depends on the strength of the correlator used to generate key. On the other hand, the privacy bound
for rDD(6−state) does depend on alignment as three high correlators are needed for key generation. We see that in our results:
first, rDD always outperforms rDD(6−state) (as mentioned in Sec. III B) and, second, the difference between the two key rates
is largest initially (when bases are the most misaligned) and slowly decreases as Alice’s and Bob’s bases begin to align.
As mentioned above, for our second experiment, we inserted three waveplates into the channel connecting Alice and Bob
to randomly vary the polarization transformation. All nine correlators were measured 17 times, and state tomography was
performed independently each time. Before each iteration the waveplates were re-positioned based on randomly generated
numbers, thus generating a random channel transformation (note that the fiber’s own transformation continued to drift as above).
In Fig. 7 we present the results. We again plot the figures of merit Smax and Cmax for each of the 17 measurements, as well
as the derived asymptotic secret key rates rDI1 , rDI2 , rDD(6−state) and rDD. For device-independent QKD, we found positive
secret key rates for rDI1 in 10 out of 17 measurements (i.e. with probability of 59%) and 1 out of 17 measurements (i.e. 6%)
for rDI2 . For device-dependent QKD, we found positive secret key rates for rDD in 17 of 17 measurements (i.e. 100%) and
in 15 of 17 measurements (i.e. 88%) for rDD(6−state). Although the size of our experimental sample is too small to really be
statistically significant, our observations appear to agree reasonably well with the predictions from the numerical simulations
above, assuming a source of entangled Werner states of visibility V slightly larger than 0.95, i.e. a tangle of ' 0.856—in
agreement with the measured tangle of the state, which was found to oscillate from 0.82 to 0.88.
Lastly, we again point out that a consistently high tangle, which our experiment maintained (up to the oscillations), is required
but not sufficient to generate positive secret key rates. A high-quality source does not guarantee the high S-parameter needed for
device-independent QKD, nor the high correlators needed for device-dependent QKD. An appropriate channel transformation is
also required.
V. DISCUSSION
We have presented a practical QKD setup in which the requirement of a common reference frame can be completely dispensed
with. A proof-of-principle demonstration of our protocols, which covers both the usual device-dependent case and the device-
independent case, was performed over 10 km of spooled fiber. Specifically, we have shown that a secret key can in principle be
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FIG. 7: Results from our randomized polarization transformation experiment, for each of our 17 experimental runs (see main text). (a–c) as in
Figure 6.
established, considering both a freely drifting spool and randomly chosen transformations, even in the device-independent case
(assuming fair sampling, and infinitely long keys).
We believe that the present ideas have potential to find applications in future long-distance quantum communication protocols,
in particular in situations where the amount time available to perform the protocol is severely constrained, e.g. in satelite
based quantum communications. The present results should be considered as a proof-of-principle experiment, and several
technical improvements are required, such as implementing random choices of measurement settings, and a finite-key security
analysis [36]. For the device-independent approach, an essential step is to close the detection loophole, which has recently been
achieved in fully optical systems [37, 38]. Finally, another challenge consists in devising efficient error-correction protocols for
high error rates, as our protocols typically lead to higher error rates compared to the standard approach in which the parties share
a common reference frame.
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